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Abstract:  Concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of international institutions have 
prompted a sizable literature on the potential of civil society to help democratize global 
economic governance.  Attention has primarily focused on the institutional factors impacting 
civil society participation in global governance.  In this article, however, I point to the 
existence of yet more fundamental barriers operating at the level of discourse.  I use critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) to analyze the discourse of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
focusing on a key text in which it attempts to engage directly with the concerns of civil 
society, supported by a broad range of additional data sources, including documentary 
materials, interviews, and observation.  Drawing on the case of the WTO, I argue that the 
discourse of the global governance institutions can itself act as an ‘invisible barricade’ 
preventing the meaningful inclusion of civil society in policy debates and deliberations. 
 
Keywords:  Global governance, international organizations, globalization, democracy, civil 
society, World Trade Organization (WTO), critical discourse analysis (CDA). 
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Introduction 
 
 Organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and World Bank are central pillars of the existing regime of global governance 
and have played a key role in driving and shaping economic globalization.  Their 
considerable authority, however, has raised concern about legitimacy, public accountability 
and the lack of democratic controls on these institutions.  This has, in turn, generated debates 
about whether and how these powerful international institutions, and the process of 
globalization itself, can be democratized.  Both academics and policymakers have placed 
significant emphasis on civil society and its potential role in fostering greater democracy at 
the global level, prompting considerable interest in how civil society is being incorporated 
into global governance. 
 Although international institutions have increased their engagement with civil society 
and now frequently point to such interaction as evidence of their openness, a central concern 
of the academic literature has been identifying and explaining the factors that constrain or 
enable meaningful civil society participation.  In the existing scholarship, however, the focus 
has been primarily on institutional or structural barriers.  In this article, I point to the 
existence of yet more fundamental barriers operating at the discursive or ideational level, 
which can constrain civil society engagement with the global governance institutions.  I 
construct this argument by examining the case of the WTO, a core institution in global 
economic governance.  Departing from a more traditional institutionalist approach, I instead 
focus on the discourse of the WTO.   
There has been increasing interest in ideational aspects of global trade politics.  
Recent studies have highlighted the role of ideas and discourse in:  constituting the WTO as 
an institution and legitimizing its authority (Cho 2014; Strange 2013); creating momentum 
for trade liberalization, while limiting policy debates on trade (Siles-Brügge 2013, Wilkinson 
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2009); constraining opportunities for civil society influence in EU trade policymaking 
(Hannah 2011) and shaping contestation surrounding its trade agreements (Del Felice 2014; 
Trommer 2014); enabling actors to gain leverage and undermine opponents in WTO 
negotiations (Conti 2011; Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Hopewell 2013; Wilkinson 2014); and 
giving rise to the structural power of expertise in trade governance (Hannah, Scott and 
Trommer 2015). 
This article contributes to the growing constructivist literature on trade by examining 
the role of discourse in the WTO’s interaction with global civil society.  It employs a fine-
grained, micro-level analysis to illuminate the exclusionary practices at work in the WTO’s 
discourse.  The analysis centers on a key text in which the WTO attempts to engage directly 
with civil society, supported by a wide range of additional data sources including 
documentary materials, interviews, and observation.  Using critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
to examine the discursive strategies employed by the WTO, I focus on how it positions itself 
and civil society, how it frames the issues under debate, and its use of silences.  Drawing on 
the case of the WTO, I argue that the discourse of the global governance institutions can itself 
act as an ‘invisible barricade’ preventing effective communication and consultation with civil 
society and blocking alternative perspectives from being introduced into policy deliberations. 
Democratizing global governance through civil society engagement? 
 
The expansive authority of international institutions has prompted considerable 
interest in the prospects for a more democratic system of global governance and whether and 
how global public policy and international institutions can be democratized (Archibugi and 
Held 2011; Falk 2014).  There is broad consensus that many of the global governance 
institutions, and particularly the multilateral economic institutions, suffer from a democratic 
deficit – that is, a deficit of democratic legitimacy and accountability (Scholte 2011).  The 
WTO, for example, has long been characterized by a culture of highly secretive, elite-based 
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decision-making and hostility to direct stakeholder involvement (Hopewell 2015b).  In this 
context, civil society has been identified as a potential democratizing force (Gill 2008; 
Scholte 2011).  Many argue that the participation of civil society in global governance 
improves openness, transparency, and accountability, making decision-making processes 
more visible and exposing policy choices to public scrutiny (Wilkinson 2014).  Civil society 
can also provide alternative norms, values and discourses, voicing opinions and perspectives 
that have been absent or marginalized from policy deliberations, and broadening the range of 
issues and scope of debate, thereby promoting deliberative democracy and making 
international institutions more responsive to popular concerns (Hannah 2011, 2014; Murphy 
2012).   
The Habermasian ideal of democratic public discourse provides a normative model 
for such deliberation and a standard against which actually-existing global governance can be 
measured.  It conceptualizes the public sphere as a site of rational-critical discourse, where 
public opinion is formed based on reasoned debate and deliberation, rather than manipulation 
of opinion, and channeled to influence, critique and shape governance (Habermas 2005).  As 
Young (2002) argues, a democratic dialogue requires that participants are willing to listen 
respectfully to alternative perspectives, making an effort to understand them without 
preemptive judgement, and with an openness to changing their own views.  An important 
marker in assessing the global governance institutions’ engagement with civil society is thus 
whether they are fostering or foreclosing such a dialogue.   
Driven by external and internal pressures, most international institutions have put in 
place measures to facilitate increased civil society involvement.  Such changes have included:  
increasing the disclosure of information, increasing staff and funding for engaging with civil 
society, providing accreditation for civil society actors, granting observer status in policy 
meetings, establishing official civil society advisory committees, and “mainstreaming” civil 
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society organizations into functional committees and bodies (Scholte 2011).  Global 
governance institutions now routinely point to these initiatives and their resulting interaction 
with civil society as evidence that they are open and democratic.  Most accounts have 
characterized these initiatives as an important step towards reducing the democratic deficit in 
global governance.  Indeed, the primary critique in the academic literature is that these 
mechanisms have not gone far enough and should be further expanded and institutionalized 
(Kapoor 2004; Mortensen 2006; Scholte 2011).  In identifying the remaining barriers, the 
focus has centered on how far specific international organizations have taken these types of 
reforms and whether they have been formally institutionalized.  It is generally taken for 
granted that these institutional initiatives are a sign of “openness” and result in meaningful 
civil society participation. 
The key question, however, is how effective such mechanisms are in fostering real 
dialogue with civil society and enabling alternative perspectives to be incorporated into the 
policymaking process.  In the analysis that follows, I show that a narrow emphasis on the 
institutional aspects of civil society incorporation neglects the existence of significant 
impediments operating at the discursive or ideational level.  Using the case of the WTO, I 
argue that attention to discourse reveals far deeper obstacles to effective civil society 
participation in global economic governance. 
The WTO and its relationship to civil society 
 
Established in 1995 as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the WTO sets and enforces the rules of the international trading system.  The 
organization includes a small secretariat charged with facilitating its work and providing 
technical and administrative assistance.  While the GATT was a comparatively weak 
organization, with limited power over its members and a narrow focus on reducing tariffs, the 
establishment of the WTO initiated a major transformation in the world trading system:  
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expanding the scope of trade rules into new areas, requiring the harmonization of domestic 
policies and regulations, and instituting a binding dispute settlement mechanism (Mortensen 
2006).   
As the scope and power of the WTO expanded, it became a flash point for criticism of 
neoliberal globalization.  Civil society actors expressed concerns about the effects of trade 
liberalization on human rights, poverty, inequality, development, the environment, labor 
standards, and health.  They also criticized the WTO’s policymaking process as exclusionary, 
undemocratic, and lacking in transparency and accountability.  Such criticism reached its 
height at the WTO’s 1999 Ministerial Meeting in Seattle.  The meeting, intended to launch a 
new round of trade negotiations, was met with mass demonstrations involving tens of 
thousands of protesters.  Physical barriers were erected to separate and protect trade policy 
makers from civil society protesters in the streets.  The ‘Battle of Seattle’ brought the WTO, 
which had previously been virtually invisible to the general public, into the spotlight and 
widespread public scrutiny for the first time.   
In response, the WTO substantially increased its efforts to inform and engage with 
civil society.  It instituted measures to:  liaise with civil society, provide briefings, organize 
symposia and workshops, accept amicus curiae briefs from civil society in dispute settlement 
proceedings, host online discussion forums and live “chats” with the Director-General, de-
restrict some documents and increase dissemination of information through its website.  
These measures would purportedly open-up the trade policymaking process and render it 
more transparent, participatory and inclusive, countering perceptions of a democratic deficit. 
These new institutional arrangements appear to have given civil society greater access 
to the WTO.  However, I contend that powerful obstacles nonetheless remain, which block 
the meaningful inclusion of civil society in policy debates and deliberations.  In the analysis 
that follows, I show how the discourse of the WTO itself acts as an ‘invisible barricade’ – 
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mirroring the physical barriers erected to separate trade policy makers from protesters at 
Seattle – preventing effective communication and consultation with civil society and barring 
alternative perspectives from being introduced into the policymaking process. 
Methodology and data 
 
This study draws on a large data corpus, incorporating a wide range of WTO 
documents pertaining to its relationship with civil society, such as public relations materials, 
speeches, press releases, information on its website, internal memoranda and policy 
directives, and materials from the annual WTO Public Forums.  The corpus also includes data 
gathered through field research at the WTO in Geneva, as well as in Washington, Ottawa, 
Montreal, New Delhi, Sao Paulo, Brasilia, and Beijing, between 2007 and 2010.  I 
interviewed 157 respondents, including 15 secretariat officials, 51 member-state negotiators, 
and 45 civil society representatives.  I also conducted over 300 hours of direct observation at 
the WTO Public Forum and numerous conferences, workshops and strategy sessions 
organized by the secretariat, states, and NGOs. 
The analysis presented here pays particular attention to one specific document – an 
official document in which the WTO attempts to address concerns from civil society, entitled 
“Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization:  Criticism, yes… misinformation, 
no!” (hereinafter the “Dialogue Text”).  In this text, the WTO sets out ten concerns raised by 
civil society and responds to each one.1  The document was produced by the WTO 
Secretariat, which is charged with managing the institution’s relationship with global civil 
society, in advance of the Seattle Ministerial and disseminated via the WTO website for over 
a decade.  Despite its age, this remains a critical document for understanding the WTO’s 
orientation towards civil society.  First, what makes this text unique and particularly fruitful 
for analysis is its dialogic quality:  it is structured as a dialogue between the WTO and civil 
1 Full document available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/misinf_e/00list_e.htm 
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society, with a comment-and-response format.  The text therefore provides an invaluable 
opportunity to see the WTO place itself in direct dialogue with civil society.  Second, this is a 
foundational text that shaped the future trajectory of WTO discourse directed at the public 
and civil society.  It has served as a model for subsequent WTO public communications, with 
many of the messages, statements, and exact wording from this text reproduced in identical 
form in later WTO documents and speeches.  Consequently, the discourse contained in the 
Dialogue Text is highly representative of that found elsewhere in the data corpus.  In 
addition, beyond this important text, the following analysis also draws on an extensive array 
of other exemplars of the WTO’s discourse, spanning the diversity of data collected, 
including documents, interviews and observation. 
To examine the discourse of the WTO, I employ critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
(Fairclough 1992; van Dijk 1993; Wodak 2005).  As an approach that looks at discourse 
within larger social and political structures and in its relationship to inequality, power and  
domination, CDA is particularly well-suited to the analysis of global governance institutions.  
CDA views discourse as a form of social action, produced by actors rooted in the social 
world, with specific intents and strategies (Wetherell 2001).  It thus provides a valuable 
means of examining the productive aspects of discourse and the work that it does.  I center 
my analysis on three key aspects of the WTO’s discourse:  its use of positioning, framing, 
and silences. 
Positioning is the discursive process whereby actors are located in a narrative, or story 
line (Davies and Harré 1990: 264).  This can include both “interactive positioning”, in which 
what one actor says positions another, and “reflexive positioning”, in which an actor 
positions itself.  Positioning can be used strategically in an effort to claim the “high ground” 
in a dispute, ensuring that one’s opponents and their statements will be interpreted according 
to a story line that suits one’s own case (Harré and Slocum 2003).  Such positioning is not 
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limited to individuals, but can also involve institutions and large-scale social entities, such as 
the WTO. 
Framing works to give representations a particular slant.  A frame is a “socially 
based, abstract, high-level knowledge structure that organizes certain information about the 
world into a coherent whole.”(Huckin 2002: 354)  Once a frame is established, it provides the 
lens through which information and events are viewed and understood.  Writers and speakers 
commonly frame issues by selectively mentioning certain things but not others, and therefore 
silences play an important role in framing.   
Silences are a critical component of discourse.  As Barbara Johnstone (2007: 10) 
shows, “in addition to being shaped by what is said, the worlds evoked and created in 
discourse also are shaped by silence:  by what cannot be said or is not said.”  Silences 
represent information that could have been given, but is selectively left out (Van Dijk 1986; 
Huckin 2002).  Discourses are organized around such practices of exclusion:  the apparent 
“naturalness” of what is said – the sense that it is obvious or self-evident – is a result of that 
which has been excluded (Mills 1997).  Often the most important aspects of discourse lie in 
the unsaid, the selective silences (Huckin 2002).   
In analyzing the discursive strategies employed by the WTO, I focus on how it 
positions itself and civil society, its framing of the issues under debate, and the silences in its 
response to civil society. 
Analyzing the discourse of the WTO 
 
The WTO’s use of positioning 
The WTO uses discourse to position both itself and civil society in very specific 
ways.  Importantly, the WTO positions itself as open to criticism and impartial.  Beginning 
by analyzing the Dialogue Text, where the WTO attempts to tackle the concerns of civil 
society head on, its subtitle states “Criticism, yes… misinformation, no!” and the introduction 
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asserts that “The WTO and its members welcome the proliferation of comment and 
criticism.”  It even provides links to two “critical [web]sites” so that readers “from around the 
world can see these opinions for themselves.”  The WTO thus appears remarkably open and 
reasonable in its willingness to consider criticism.  By positioning itself in this way, the WTO 
is engaging in “stake inoculation” (Potter 1997; Wetherell 2001), efforts directed at 
inoculating against the appearance of having an interest or bias in one’s account, as a pre-
emptive strategy aimed at preventing the potential undermining of one’s argument.  In the 
Dialogue Text, stake inoculation creates the impression that the WTO is giving fair and 
impartial consideration to concerns from civil society.  Although the WTO ultimately rejects 
every one of the ten criticisms raised by civil society, this is presented as the result of 
balanced and rational consideration and its superior knowledge and expertise.  Positioning 
itself as open and unbiased, stake inoculation enables the WTO to mask the politicized nature 
of its own discourse and increase the credibility of its claims by presenting them as fair, 
impartial truth or fact.   
However, the WTO’s claims to openness and neutrality can be evaluated by 
examining the way in which it actually engages with arguments from civil society.  
Throughout its discourse, the WTO positions itself in the role of the omniscient expert.  In 
each exchange in the Dialogue Text, the argument from civil society is labeled “The 
accusation,” while the WTO’s reply is titled “The reality.”  The WTO positions itself not as 
equal to its critics, but above them, assuming the authority to evaluate the “evidence” and 
establish the “facts.”  The WTO thus situates itself in the privileged role of arbiter with the 
power to evaluate the critic’s arguments and determine their truth or falsity.  While the WTO 
uses positioning to build its own authority, it also makes use of positioning to delegitimize 
and undermine challenges and contestation from civil society.  It is significant that critical 
arguments made by civil society are cast as “accusations,” as the term is a highly loaded one:  
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while one engages with arguments, one defends against accusations.  From the start of the 
Dialogue Text, the WTO characterizes arguments from civil society in such a way that it is 
unlikely to engage with them, but instead to attempt to shield against or discredit them.  The 
way in which the WTO positions the arguments from civil society sets the stage not for 
dialogue or effective communication but for an act of rhetorical self-defense.   
Furthermore, the tone of the WTO’s response is highly dismissive of the arguments 
from civil society.  In contrast to the purportedly factual information presented by the WTO 
(“The reality”), the arguments of civil society are identified in the document merely as 
“opinions” and “comments.”  Indeed, they are further described as “misinformation,” based 
on “factual errors,” “incorrect information,” and “downright falsehoods.”  The visuals and 
layout of the Dialogue Text reinforce the message that civil society concerns are not to be 
taken seriously:  the statements from civil society are set on a background resembling a brick 
wall, with torn, rough edges, suggesting associations with graffiti.  Remarkably, not once 
throughout the entire Dialogue Text is there any acknowledgement that the concerns voiced 
by civil society have any legitimacy or validity.     
Shifting to other examples of WTO discourse, similar patterns are evident.  The 
dismissive attitudes of trade officials towards civil society actors and the issues they raise are 
equally apparent in interviews:   
the level of misunderstanding was just about, well, sky-high.  It was really 
almost 100%…  there was kind of a visceral reaction against [the WTO].  And 
we had things like the Seattle schmozzles and so forth – demonstrations of one 
kind or another, from people who basically believed it was all kinds of 
monstrous things.2 
 
it wasn’t our job [the WTO Secretariat’s] to kind of jump into the debate and 
say ‘no, we don’t cause AIDS [laughs], and no, we’re not the cause of most of 
the ills of the world, and no, we’re not killing Indian farmers, and this is not 
our business, etc.’…  if they’re critical of it [the WTO], well that’s their right, 
but at least they should know what to criticize [laughs].3 
2 Interview, July 2007. 
3 Ibid.   
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The arguments advanced by many civil society actors are presented as ridiculous – the 
product of a lack of knowledge or understanding of economics and the WTO – or attributable 
to something more malicious.  In a speech opening the WTO’s first Public Forum, for 
example, then Director-General Mike Moore referred to the Seattle protesters as “mindless, 
undemocratic enemies of the open society” whose “slogans are trite, shallow and 
superficial.”(WTO 2001) 
The WTO clearly does not grant civil society equal status as interlocutors.  Its claims 
that it is open to criticism are, in fact, contradicted by its actual treatment of critical 
arguments from civil society.  The WTO represents itself as open to criticism, neutral, 
unbiased and expert, while its critics’ arguments are represented as accusations and 
misinformation that are false and even slanderous against the WTO.  This discursive 
technique has the effect of discrediting and discouraging challenges and contestation from 
civil society.  It also sets up the response of the WTO to critical arguments from civil society 
as one of defense rather than dialogue, thereby lessening the likelihood that the concerns they 
raise will be brought into WTO debates and deliberations. 
The WTO’s framing of trade issues 
Throughout its discourse, the WTO frames trade issues as technical matters of fact, 
evidence, and expertise.  In the Dialogue Text, for instance, it characterizes the points raised 
by civil society as “accusations” and “misinformation,” stating that “those making the 
accusations listed here have quite simply got their facts wrong” and that these criticisms are 
“completely false.”  Conversely, the WTO labels its own response to civil society as “the 
reality,” which it frames with frequent references to “the facts” and “evidence.”  Its response 
is structured as a series of declarations (such as “the WTO ... is ultra-democratic”, “the WTO 
is run only by governments”), which, as Johnstone (2007) indicates, is a discursive strategy 
used to inhibit the possibility of disagreement and discourage debate.  Many of the 
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supposedly “factual” claims the WTO makes are highly contested (such as “the evidence 
points to trade making a major contribution to increasing standards of living and to lifting 
people out of poverty” and “there is no question that patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
has … helped to save lives”).  Yet, the contentious nature of the claims being made is 
suppressed by presenting them as simple and objective facts known to the WTO and 
communicated to the reader.   
This framing of trade as a technical issue – and thus the proper domain of experts – is 
found throughout the discourse of trade officials.  As quoted above, for example, a secretariat 
official referred to the Seattle protests as a “visceral reaction,” illustrating how the Cartesian 
divide – between reason, logic and rationality, on the one hand, and emotion and irrationality, 
on the other (Lloyd 1984) – is brought into play by WTO officials, used to frame trade issues 
and define appropriate forms of behaviour and engagement.  In characterizing the Seattle 
protests as a “visceral” reaction (i.e., bodily, emotional, irrational), the implicit contrast is 
with a reasoned consideration of fact.  Director-General Moore similarly wrote off the Seattle 
protesters as “mindless,” while another official described it as “just an outcry against 
globalization and the WTO.”4   
This dualism, in which logic and knowledge are contrasted with emotion, irrationality, 
and ideology, appeared repeatedly in interviews with trade officials.  One negotiator, for 
example, described his critics as “overly emotional.”5  In discussing one such “emotional” 
issue – high rates of farmer suicides in India that civil society actors link to trade 
liberalization – several negotiators rolled their eyes in disdain and made air quotes while 
referring to “India’s suicidal farmers.”6  Another official described critics of liberalization as 
“paranoid.”7  A frequent critique of any opposing position was that it was “out of touch with 
4 Ibid. 
5 Interviews, April 2009. 
6 Interviews, September 2008-June 2009.  
7 Interview, May 2010. 
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reality” or “unrealistic.”8  Negotiators repeatedly contrasted “mere rhetoric” with “hard 
research.”9  They were explicitly dismissive of “romantic, idealistic proposals,” as well as 
“more ideological actors” and “philosophical debate,” and stressed the importance of a 
“pragmatic” rather than “ideological stance.”10  In contrast, what trade officials indicated they 
value are “intellectual” contributions – “the hard, technical work, the solid contribution of 
ideas.”11  For negotiators, a “constructive contribution” is equated not with “[ideological or 
political] positions or statements” but “technical or legal inputs” and the ability “to do the 
heavy lifting” by conducting sophisticated econometric and legal analysis and putting 
together “technically sound, solid” proposals.12   
From the discourse of trade officials, it is clear that what qualifies a speaker as 
authoritative, and thus accords them the right to speak and be heard, is the possession of 
expert knowledge and sophisticated technical capabilities.  As one secretariat official 
explicitly stated, “we respond to the most informed sectors [of civil society],”13 indicating 
that the WTO will not engage with civil society actors it does not consider sufficiently 
“informed.”  Likewise, the Dialogue Text describes issues surrounding the WTO as 
“complex” and, in some cases, “debatable,” but only based on sophisticated “facts” and 
“evidence,” accessible to experts like the trade policymakers themselves.  As the quotes in 
the previous section illustrate, WTO officials tend to believe critics of the organization 
simply do not understand it.  In interviews, civil society’s criticism of the WTO is 
characterized as based on “a tremendous amount of confusion and misinformation” and 
“fallacious understanding.”14  Secretariat officials charged with managing its relationship 
8 Interviews, March 2009. 
9 Interviews, September 2008-June 2009. 
10 Interviews, March 2009 and May 2010. 
11 Interview, May 2009. 
12 Interviews, June 2007, September 2008-June 2009, and May 2010. 
13 Interview, June 2007. 
14 Ibid.   
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with civil society consequently define their primary role as “educating” civil society about 
trade and the WTO.  As one of its civil society liaisons put it, “we look for the things that 
people don’t understand and then we’ll explain what the situation is … we want to set the 
record straight.”15   
It is significant that officials emphasize the flow of information outwards from the 
WTO to civil society rather than the reverse:  trade officials do not recognize most civil 
society actors as legitimate interlocutors with the potential to offer input of any value into 
trade debates and deliberations at the WTO.  Since WTO officials are primarily preoccupied 
with explaining, they do little listening.  At one major event organized by NGOs to facilitate 
dialogue between civil society and trade officials, for example, in a session with over 200 
civil society representatives, then Director-General Lamy responded (at times with evident 
exasperation) to nearly every question or comment from civil society (ranging from the plight 
of poor peasant farmers vulnerable to trade liberalization to how WTO rules continue to 
block access to HIV/AIDS drugs) by refuting the concern being raised and repeatedly stating 
“that’s not what the WTO is” and “that’s not how it works.”16 
The WTO’s framing of trade constructs it as a technocratic rather than political issue.  
Its discourse presents trade in narrowly economic terms, seemingly divorced from political 
questions and normative disputes.  This can be seen as a strategy to “economize” (Fraser 
1992), and thereby depoliticize, trade issues:  casting them as technical problems for experts, 
rather than matters for open, public debate and diverse forms of political contestation.  
Indeed, one WTO publication states that a key benefit of the multilateral trading system is 
that “governments are shielded from lobbying” and “protectionist pressure.”(WTO 2008)  
15 Ibid. 
16 “Confronting the Global Food Challenge” Conference, Geneva, November 2008. 
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Trade bureaucrats are generally suspicious of politics and resistant to what is seen as 
“political” interference in trade policymaking (Hannah 2011).   
The WTO’s framing implies that global trade regulation is simply about evaluating 
the facts to determine what is best for the common good.  A speech by the Director-General, 
for example, declares that the WTO “harness[es] globalization for the benefit of all.”(WTO 
2006)  One public information document outlines the reasons why “we’re better off with the 
[WTO] system” and asserts that WTO agreements “are made in the interests of 
everyone.”(WTO 2008)  The claim that the WTO serves the interests of the common good is 
ever-present.  Yet, as Nancy Fraser (1992: 131) argues, “when social arrangements operate to 
the systemic profit of some groups of people and to the systemic detriment of others” claims 
to represent the common good “should be regarded with suspicion.”  Certainly in the realm of 
trade, what constitutes the “common good” is a deeply political and contested question, 
inseparable from the interplay of competing interests and ideologies.  Yet, trade officials tend 
to see their own positions as value-neutral, outside of ideology or interests, and simply based 
on fact.  When trade officials criticize others for being “ideological,” they fail to recognize 
that their own faith in the power of free trade to enhance global welfare is itself an ideology, 
and one disputed by many civil society actors. 
Casting trade as a technical issue has important implications for determining who can 
speak authoritatively and who cannot.  As the quotes from officials above indicate, the 
political activism of civil society – colorful street protests, normative claims to social justice, 
and broad criticism of the neoliberal trade agenda – is seen as a troublesome and 
inappropriate intrusion into the realm of trade experts.  Consequently, civil society actors 
struggle to be “taken seriously”17 at the WTO – a situation one likened to facing “a brick 
17 This was mentioned repeatedly in interviews. 
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wall.”18  Most civil society actors thus remain highly marginalized and excluded from 
debates and deliberations at the WTO. 
Silences in the response of the WTO 
At the WTO, neoliberal doctrine has the status of orthodoxy (Eagleton-Pierce 2012).   
Since freeing market forces from “artificial” constraints is believed to automatically and 
invariably generate increased efficiency and material well-being, the goal of liberalizing trade 
is treated as common sense (Siles-Brügge 2013; Wilkinson 2014) – literally:  according to 
one official publication (WTO 2015), the “economic case” for free trade is “simple” and rests 
on “common sense.”  Trade, it maintains, works to “sharpen competition, motivate 
innovation and breed success.”  Conversely, policies that deviate from the principles of free 
markets are “self-defeating and destructive,” leading to “bloated, inefficient producers 
supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive products,” such that ultimately “factories 
close and jobs are lost” and “markets contract and world economic activity is reduced.”  
Likewise, another publication states that the WTO “helps promote peace,” “cuts the costs of 
living,” “raises incomes,” “stimulates economic growth,” and “makes life more efficient,” 
among other benefits (WTO 2008).  These purported “virtues” serve as a key source of 
legitimation and justification for the WTO and its project of continued trade liberalization 
(WTO 2006). 
Throughout its discourse, the WTO presents trade liberalization as an unambiguous 
good.  But this idealized construction of trade liberalization is built upon a discernable pattern 
of silences.  These silences become strikingly apparent when we examine the WTO’s attempt 
to respond directly to the issues and concerns raised by civil society, as in the Dialogue Text.  
Such silences take two forms:  evading the issue being raised and redirecting to another topic 
18 Interview, June 2007. 
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to present a more favorable case, and omitting facts that would disrupt a pro-WTO, pro-free 
trade narrative.   
An analysis of these silences in the WTO’s discourse – what could have been said but 
was not, and to what effect – offers important insight into the nature of its engagement with 
civil society and the prospects for open and meaningful dialogue.  Examining the Dialogue 
Text, for example, in one exchange, civil society raises the following concerns:  
The WTO only serves the interests of multinational corporations:  The WTO is 
not a democratic institution, and yet its policies impact all aspects of society and 
the planet. The WTO rules are written by and for corporations with inside access 
to the negotiations… 
 
Although the central issue being raised by civil society relates to the influence of business 
actors at the WTO, this is largely elided in the WTO’s response, which seeks to assert its 
democratic credentials by focusing primarily on inter-state relations within the institution.   
The WTO’s response begins by stating:  “The WTO is as democratic as its member 
governments; and between the members it is ultra-democratic because decisions are taken by 
consensus – all members have to be persuaded.”  Yet, the WTO is silent on how this 
“consensus” is achieved.  As considerable scholarship has documented, decision-making 
within the institution frequently comes down to a “raw use of power” with outcomes 
reflecting underlying power imbalances among states; the WTO’s consensus-based decision-
making process is accordingly best described as a form of “organized hypocrisy” that serves 
to legitimate WTO outcomes (Steinberg 2002).  For its entire history, the multilateral trading 
system has been dominated by the US, EU and a small group of other powerful states (Kelly 
and Grant 2005; Hopewell 2015a).  Key negotiations take place in informal “green room” 
negotiations amongst a few core participants, with agreements presented to the rest of the 
membership as a fait accompli.  The major powers have structured WTO rules to suit their 
own interests, while the vast majority of states lack the power to influence negotiating 
outcomes, or even what issues get on the table.  The WTO/GATT has long been criticized for 
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failing to address the concerns of developing countries:  in the last Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations, the US and other rich countries made major gains at the expense of developing 
countries, using arm-twisting and the threat of unilateral trade sanctions to force them to 
“consent” to the agreement (Shadlen 2005; Gallagher 2008).  There are also major questions 
about the democratic accountability of the WTO dispute settlement system, given that the 
authority of dispute panels made up of appointed trade lawyers and experts can supersede that 
of democratically-elected member states, forcing the reversal of national laws and regulations 
(Mortensen 2006).  There are thus major silences in the WTO’s assertion that it is “ultra-
democratic.”   
This pattern of silences continues in the next section of the WTO’s response, which 
states:  
The rules are written by member governments, no one else has access to the 
negotiations. 
 
However, governments, which are elected democratically by their citizens, do take 
into account the views of various groups in their societies. How they do that is up 
to them and their citizens. Governments regularly cite pressure from consumer, 
environmental, human rights and labour organizations, as well as business. The 
structure of negotiations also helps governments strike a more equitable balance 
between various interest groups over a broad range of issues. 
 
Such claims are frequently repeated in other documents, where the WTO specifically 
identifies one of its benefits as helping to reduce the power of lobbyists and special interest 
groups – that it “shields governments from lobbying” by “narrow interest groups” and 
enables them to “ward off powerful lobbies.”(WTO 2008) 
The WTO is silent, however, on the huge corporate presence at the negotiations.  
Business actors, while excluded from the actual negotiating rooms, descend en masse on the 
negotiations and are in constant contact with negotiators throughout, and there is considerable 
evidence that business actors have a major impact on the agreements.  In the Uruguay Round, 
for example, American multinationals were the driving force behind the creation of the 
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agreements on services, intellectual property, investment and agriculture, which were 
concluded against the will of many developing countries (Sell 2006; McMichael 1998).  
During negotiations on the financial services agreement, US giants Citicorp, Goldman Sachs, 
Merrill Lynch and various insurance companies set up command posts near the WTO and 
conferred with American officials throughout (Sell 2006).  In addition, contrary to the claim 
that “no one else has access to the negotiations,” business actors do, in fact, attend 
negotiating sessions as part of member-state delegations (Hopewell 2013).  Similar influence 
is evident in dispute settlement.  In the EU banana case, for example, although few bananas 
are produced in the US, the American government was persuaded by the ‘Big Three’ – 
Chiquita, Del Monte and Dole – to launch an attack on the EU banana regime, which gave 
preferential access to otherwise uncompetitive African and Caribbean banana producers 
(Mortensen 2006).  As Sauvé and Subramanian (2001: 19) state, “the [WTO] system is 
ultimately powered and driven by private sector interests that seek market opening abroad.”  
Yet, the WTO’s response – and its claims to democratic legitimacy – entirely evades the 
concerns about corporate influence being raised by civil society.   
Lastly, the WTO responds by stating that “Before they take effect, WTO rules and 
agreements are approved by all national parliaments.”  However, the implication that 
ratification of WTO rules and agreements by national parliaments serves to ensure their 
democratic legitimacy is also based on a significant omission:  the fact that, for most 
countries, ratification amounts to no more than a rubber stamp (Kapoor 2004).  In the case of 
the Uruguay Round and the resulting set of agreements that created the WTO, for example, 
most legislatures faced a Hobson’s choice of either ratifying the agreements or losing their 
existing access to foreign markets based on earlier GATT agreements, with potentially dire 
economic consequences (Steinberg 2002). 
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Similar patterns are evident in the responses the WTO provides to other civil society 
concerns elsewhere in the Dialogue Text.  Just as it is silent on important questions regarding 
the decision-making process at the WTO, it is equally silent on issues related to the outcomes 
of trade liberalization.  Another concern being raised by civil society is that free trade has not 
benefited the majority of the world’s population and that inequality has worsened:   
The WTO is increasing inequality:  Free trade is not working for the majority of 
the world. During the most recent period of rapid growth in global trade and 
investment — 1960 to 1998 — inequality worsened both internationally and 
within countries. The UN Development Program reports that the richest 20 
percent of the world's population consume 86 percent of the world's resources 
while the poorest 80 percent consume just 14 percent. WTO rules have hastened 
these trends…  
 
There is, indeed, considerable evidence to support this claim that global income inequality 
has risen during recent decades of trade liberalization and other neoliberal economic policies 
(UN 2005; Wade 2011).   
However, while civil society is calling for a discussion of the effects of trade 
liberalization on inequality, once again, the WTO’s response attempts to shut down rather 
than open and facilitate such a dialogue.  In its response, the WTO sidesteps the central issue 
being raised by civil society – inequality – and instead shifts to another issue – poverty.  
Despite the fact that poverty is not even mentioned in the critics’ argument, it is the focus of 
the WTO’s response, which states that “All the evidence points to trade making a major 
contribution to increasing standards of living and to lifting people out of poverty.  The 
majority would almost certainly be poorer if there had been no trade liberalization and no 
international trade rules.”  It even goes so far as to suggest that arguing against liberalization 
“amounts to arguing that the poorest people in the world should be kept poor.”  Similar 
claims are common in the WTO’s discourse:  in a recent speech, for example, Director-
General Azevedo maintained that trade liberalization:  “affects the poorest the most.  By 
boosting development, trade has helped to cut poverty around the world.”(WTO 2014)   
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This position is in keeping with the standard neoliberal argument that free trade 
promotes economic growth and therefore raises incomes and reduces poverty.  However, the 
assertion that trade liberalization will automatically produce economic growth, reduced 
poverty and development – what Dani Rodrik (2009) calls a “utopian vision” – is highly 
suspect.  For many developing countries, the effects of trade liberalization and associated 
neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s were profoundly negative – resulting in one and 
sometimes two “lost decades” of dismal growth performance and worsening income 
inequality and poverty (Monga and Lin 2015; Stiglitz et al 2013).  There is growing 
recognition that trade liberalization cannot be counted on to provide economic growth, and 
growth alone is far from sufficient for poverty reduction (Stiglitz et al 2013).  Furthermore, 
evaluations of GATT/WTO agreements to date suggest that they have disproportionately 
benefited rich, advanced-industrialized states (Wilkinson 2014).   
In sum, the WTO’s response to civil society displays a telling patterns of silences.  
The arguments being made by civil society are simply not registering in the WTO’s response.  
The WTO is talking past its critics, ignoring the concerns they are raising.  In the first 
example, the primary argument being made by critics relates to how decisions are made at the 
WTO and who is able to influence them, and thus who it is that is driving the process of trade 
liberalization.  However, the WTO elides rather than answers civil society’s arguments about 
decision-making at the WTO and completely takes the issue of power imbalances – both 
among states and between business and civil society – out of the picture.  Its response serves 
to deny the existence of power in the international system and its role in shaping the rules of 
the international trading system.  Similarly, in the second example, the WTO evades the 
questions being raised by its civil society critics about inequality and the distributional 
implications of trade liberalization, and even when it reframes the issue, there are selective 
omissions in its characterization of the effects of trade liberalization on poverty.  These 
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silences in the WTO’s rebuttal – the parts of the critics’ arguments it does not even begin to 
address – are significant in that they reveal a profound unwillingness on the part of the WTO 
to engage in genuine dialogue with actors voicing criticism of the neoliberal orthodoxy. 
Conclusion 
 In this analysis, I have shown how exclusionary practices operate in and through the 
discourse of the WTO.  The WTO discursively positions itself as open, neutral, unbiased, and 
expert, while discrediting and discouraging challenges and contestation from civil society.  Its 
response to civil society is one of defense rather than dialogue, lessening the likelihood that 
issues raised by civil society will be brought into WTO debates on trade issues.  At the same 
time, the WTO frames the debates surrounding it as issues of fact, evidence and expertise, 
and therefore works to construct trade as a technical/managerial rather than political issue.  
This functions to depoliticize trade issues, removing them from the realm of public debate.  
In addition, the WTO’s response to its civil society critics is frequently evasive and fails to 
address many of their key concerns.  Combined, these discursive techniques reinforce rather 
than dismantle hierarchical power relations between the WTO and civil society and 
discourage dialogue with civil society and its inclusive participation in trade policy debates 
and deliberations.  Efforts to open the policymaking process and to render it more 
transparent, participatory, and inclusive are in fact undermined by the discourse of the WTO.   
Analysis of the WTO’s discourse shows the neoliberal orthodoxy at work in the 
global trade regime – and why it is so difficult for civil society to penetrate.  Although the 
current Doha Round of trade negotiations has become blocked by a stalemate between the 
traditional powers – the US and EU – and emerging challengers – China, India and Brazil – 
over the relative concessions to be made by each side (Hopewell 2015a), the negotiations 
continue and the WTO’s existing rules and dispute settlement procedures remain in force and 
actively in use.  Meanwhile, a substantial amount of negotiating activity has shifted to 
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bilateral and regional trade agreements.  Many negotiators have moved from the WTO to 
work on these other agreements, and similar dynamics are likely to be present in their 
interaction with civil society.   
Existing scholarship has stressed the need to incorporate civil society as a means of 
democratizing global governance, and international institutions have eagerly publicized their 
new initiatives directed at civil society.  However, this study provides reason to be cautious in 
our assessment of how effective such mechanisms are in fostering meaningful dialogue with 
civil society and enabling alternative perspectives to be incorporated into the policymaking 
process.  The case of the WTO suggests that in order to understand the prospects for more 
deliberatively democratic global governance, it is not sufficient to solely examine formal, 
institutional structures.  Discourse analysis adds valuable insights missing from a strictly 
institutional approach by pointing to the existence of important barriers operating at the 
discursive level.  Analysis of the WTO underscores the importance of discursive constraints 
that may impede civil society participation in global governance.
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